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JANUS AND THE FUTURE OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: RHETORICALLY PREDICTING A 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO NEGOTIATION 
THOMAS J. FREEMAN* 
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DESTYNIE J.L. SEWELL*** 
ABSTRACT 
The importance of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Janus 
v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
has been widely recognized for its effect on reducing the power and 
influence of public unions. A close reading of the majority opinion 
provides a clue that compulsory collective bargaining itself may be 
settling into the court’s crosshairs. Collective bargaining is an im-
portant tool, by which labor can reduce the often-inherent power 
imbalance it has with ownership and management. Yet as this 
Article outlines, the interests of individual workers can often be at 
odds with those other workers or even the union itself. When the law 
designates a union as the exclusive bargaining agent for a group 
of workers, it prohibits individual workers from advocating for 
their own interests. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in 
Janus, this results in a substantial reduction of the rights of 
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workers, particularly those who do not feel the union represents 
their interests. This Article will explore the history of unions and 
collective bargaining, the variety of worker rights that are affected 
by compulsory collective bargaining, why the Supreme Court might 
choose to eliminate compulsory collective bargaining via the First 
Amendment, and what may ultimately replace it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Janus1 was a 
game changer. The central question presented to the Court was 
whether public unions can charge non-members they nonetheless 
represent in collective bargaining. The Court held that public un-
ions cannot require non-members to pay fees, often called “agency 
fees,” even for services the union provides. The Court then went 
one step further and required that public employees must opt in 
to union membership, rather than being automatically enrolled 
as members and provided the opportunity to opt out. 
 Much attention has been paid to how the Janus decision 
will deplete the ranks and coffers of public unions, diminishing 
their political power, and hurting the Democratic Party, which 
derives much of its support from public unions.2 Perhaps even 
more interesting than the political impact of the Janus decision 
however, is the effect of the Court’s holdings on the future of 
mandatory collective bargaining itself. In many states, public un-
ions are the sole bargaining agent for groups of employees, whether 
those employees are union members or not.3 We believe that the 
Janus decision may have a tremendous impact on this practice, 
perhaps even culminating in the end of compulsory collective 
bargaining altogether. 
 This Article will focus on collective bargaining within public 
unions. Part I will briefly address the history and development 
of labor unions and collective bargaining. Part II will discuss the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Janus. Finally, Part III will 
use rhetorical methodologies to examine the likely effects (legal, 
political, and economic) of the Janus decision’s reframing of the 
1 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018). 
2 James Feigenbaum & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, The Supreme Court 
just dealt unions a big blow in Janus. Here’s what you need to know about the 
political fallout, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/27/the-supreme-court-just-dealt-un 
ions-a-big-blow-in-janus-heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-political-fall 
out/?utm_term=.7b31b07f59f6 [https://perma.cc/L32M-R9ZY]; Amanda Vinicky, 
In Wake of Janus Decision, What’s Next for Public Unions, WTTW CHI. (July 2, 
2018), https://news.wttw.com/2018/07/02/wake-janus-decision-what-s-next-public 
-unions [https://perma.cc/4BW5-4ZWW]. 
3 ACLU, Collective Bargaining and Civil Liberties, https://www.aclu.org 
/other/collective-bargaining-and-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/U9DX-DZFW]. 
2020] JANUS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  613 
First Amendment in the context of compulsory collective bargain-
ing vis-à-vis public unions. 
I. BRIEF UNION HISTORY: POWER IMBALANCES BETWEEN 
LABOR AND MANAGEMENT CREATED LOW WAGES AND 
POOR WORKING CONDITIONS 
 In the late nineteenth century, there existed a massive 
power imbalance between employers and employees.4 Employers, 
particularly large companies like Standard Oil, Carnegie Steel, 
and others were worth vast sums of money. John D. Rockefeller, 
Jr. became the world’s first billionaire in 1916, controlling a sum 
worth close to $30 billion today.5 An even more telling measure 
of his power is that when Rockefeller died in 1937, his assets 
equaled 1.5 percent of America’s total economic output, a feat that 
would require about $340 billion today.6 While Rockefeller and 
his Standard Oil Empire represented the most extreme example 
at the time, other titans of industry such as Andrew Carnegie 
and Carnegie Steel (later U.S. Steel), Cornelius Vanderbilt and 
his railroad empire, J.P. Morgan and his financial and business 
empire, and others controlled vast swaths of American business.7 
The average worker could be overworked, underpaid, and forced 
to endure horrible working conditions, without recourse.8 
Working conditions in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century were frequently abysmal.9 Authors like Upton 
Sinclair,10 Charles Dickens,11 John Steinbeck,12 George Orwell,13 
4 G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions In The U.S., 
WHO RULES AMERICA?, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/history_of_la 
bor_unions.html [https://perma.cc/BU97-D5YV]. 
5 Carl O’Donnell, The Rockefellers: The Legacy of History’s Richest Man, 
FORBES (July 11, 2014, 11:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlodonnell 
/2014/07/11/the-rockefellers-the-legacy-of-historys-richest-man/#5e4410ca3c26 
[https://perma.cc/KT4M-SBHG]. 
6 Id. 
7 DIANE TELGEN, DEFINING MOMENTS THE GILDED AGE 45 (2012). 
8 Working Conditions in the Industrial Revolution, HISTORY CRUNCH, https:// 
www.historycrunch.com/working-conditions-in-the-industrial-revolution.html#/ 
[https://perma.cc/AG9E-8RNR]. 
9 Id. 
10 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). 
11 CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (1854). 
12 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (James Lloyd, ed., 1939). 
13 GEORGE ORWELL, THE ROAD TO WIGAN PIER (Victor Gollancz, ed., 1937). 
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and countless others documented issues with workplace safety, 
cleanliness, long working hours, and other horrifying issues 
workers faced.14 Incidents like the strike and ensuing violence at 
Carnegie Steel’s Homestead plant also raised public awareness 
about the poor working conditions many people faced.15 From this 
precarious economic moment, the modern American labor move-
ment began to gain strength. 
 As the power of labor unions and workers grew, working 
conditions and inequities in compensation started to be addressed.16 
A variety of laws were passed during the twentieth century, which 
substantially enhanced the rights and working conditions for 
workers. These are a few examples: 
• The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), initially 
passed in 1938, limited the number of hours children 
under 16 could work in non-agricultural positions, pro-
hibited the hiring of those under 18 for certain high-
risk jobs, and established a federal minimum wage.17 
• The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits sex-based wage 
discrimination between men and women working for 
the same employer and performing substantially simi-
lar jobs.18 
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal 
for businesses to discriminate based on “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”19 
• The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
prohibits discrimination against workers 40 years of 
age or older.20 
14 Joe Sommerlad, Karl Marx at 200: Ten Left-Wing Writers Who Followed 
in the Footsteps of a Giant, INDEPENDENT (May 4, 2018, 3:31 PM), https:// 
www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/features/karl-marx-200 
-years-anniversary-left-wing-novelists-george-orwell-hg-wells-john-steinbeck 
-a8333991.html [https://perma.cc/9NWG-CNDF].  
15 ARTHUR BURGOYNE, THE HOMESTEAD STRIKE OF 1892 (1979). 
16 Domhoff, supra note 4. 
17 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
18 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). See also Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OP-
PORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/brochure-equal 
_pay_and_ledbetter_act.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y8A8-3FCR] [hereinafter EEOC]. 
19 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (1964). 
20 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
624 (2012). 
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• The Occupational Safety and Health Act established 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) in 1970.21 OSHA assures “safe and healthy 
working conditions for working men and women by 
setting and enforcing standards and by providing 
training, outreach, education and assistance.”22 Since 
its passage, Congress has expanded OSHA’s whistle-
blower authority 22 times to protect workers from 
discrimination.23 
• The Americans with Disabilities Act, passed in 1990, 
provides broad protections against employment dis-
crimination for those with qualified disabilities.24 
• The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 provides 
eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave 
per year to deal with the birth of a child, an adoption, 
or a personal or family member’s medical condition.25 
• The Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 prohibits wage 
discrimination against women and minorities. It was 
passed to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 
550 U.S. 618 (2007), which severely restricted the 
time period for filing complaints of employment dis-
crimination concerning compensation.26 Under the 
Ledbetter Act, each paycheck that contains discrim-
inatory compensation is a separate violation regard-
less of when the discrimination began.27 
 A tremendous amount of thought and effort have gone into 
enacting laws that make workplaces safe and prohibit employers 
from treating their employees unfairly.28 There is no doubt that 
21 Reflections on OSHA’s History, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Jan. 2009), https:// 
www.osha.gov/history/OSHA_HISTORY_3360s.pdf [http://perma.cc/8X2L-NM8J]. 
22 About OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha, 
[https://perma.cc/9T5V-RHVU]. 
23 The Whistleblower Protection Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https:// 
www.whistleblowers.gov/ [https://perma.cc/WY8Z-D6UT]. 
24 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www 
.dol.gov/general/topic/disability/ada [https://perma.cc/73F4-L37Q]. 
25 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611–2654 (2012). 
26 EEOC, supra note 18. 
27 Id. 
28 See generally id.  
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labor unions have played an important historical role in bring-
ing about those changes. One of the most important tools unions 
have used is the power of collective action.29 
A. The Rise of Unions and Development of Collective Bargaining 
 While employers have historically enjoyed a power imbalance 
vis-à-vis individual employees, that is not necessarily the case when 
the employees work together.30 Even employers inclined to abuse 
or mistreat individual employees are forced to think twice if by 
doing so they might alienate their entire workforce and risk a strike 
or walkout.31 Labor unions and the collective bargaining process 
were introduced in an attempt to increase the bargaining power 
of workers, better their working conditions, and increase their 
compensation.32 Individual workers had almost no ability to ne-
gotiate with massive companies and were easily replaceable.33 
They banded together and formed unions, largely so they could 
institute the practice of collective bargaining and negotiate their 
compensation, benefits, working conditions, and other conditions 
of employment as a group.34 When a company’s entire workforce, 
or the workers in a particular industry, joined forces, they ac-
quired much more power.35 Unions could wield enormous power, 
mostly through the threat that the entire workforce would walk 
out or strike and shut down a company’s business.36 The union 
would negotiate on behalf of all the workers through collective 
bargaining.37 This helped to end or at least mitigate the so-called 
“race to the bottom,” where management could choose to employ 
the individual workers willing to endure the worst working con-
ditions and receive the least amount of compensation.38 
29 ACLU, supra note 3.  
30 Aditi Bagchi, Note, The Myth Of Equality In The Employment Relation, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 583–85 (2009).  
31 Id. at 625.  
32 Id. at 614–15. 
33 See JOHN P. FREY, CRAFT UNIONS OF ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES 70–71 
(1945). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id.  
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
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 The power of unions has declined as their membership has 
declined, both in raw numbers and as a percentage of the popu-
lation.39 The number of employed union members has declined by 
2.9 million since 1983.40 During the same time, the number of all 
wage and salary workers grew from 88.3 million to 133.7 million.41 
“Consequently, the union membership rate was 20.1 percent in 
1983 and declined to 11.1 percent in 2015.”42 This drop in union 
membership has been felt far more sharply in the private sector 
than in the public sector.43 “In 2015, public-sector workers had a 
union membership rate of 35.2 percent, more than five times 
higher than that of private sector workers (6.7 percent).”44 “While 
the unionization rate for the public sector has remained relatively 
steady over time, the rate for the private sector has declined from 
16.8 percent in 1983 to 6.7 percent in 2015.”45 
 “Today, the United States has three distinct regimes of 
collective bargaining: one for the railroad and airline industries, 
one for the rest of the private sector, and one for the public sector.”46 
This Article focuses on collective bargaining within public unions. 
The public sector regime is really fifty-one distinct systems, rep-
resenting the federal system and then fifty different state systems.47 
Currently, thirty-one states permit collective bargaining for pub-
lic employees to some level, while nineteen states prohibit the 
practice.48 In states that permit collective bargaining, unions cer-
tified by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) serve as the 
exclusive bargaining agent for groups of employees.49 
39 See Megan Dunn & James Walker, Union Membership in the United States, 
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016 
/union-membership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united 
-states.pdf [http://perma.cc/LQ3X-7Q5N]. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See id.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Lance A Compa, An Overview of Collective Bargaining in the United States, 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL DIGITAL COMMONS (2014), https://digital 
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1925&context=articles [https:// 
perma.cc/UX23-6K85]. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. (citing Shimabukuro, infra note 50). 
49 See id. 
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 In states that permit public unions to negotiate on behalf 
of public employees, those unions are required to represent all of 
the public employees within a bargaining unit, even those who 
choose not to join the union.50 This creates what is commonly 
called a “free rider problem,” where public employees who derive 
the benefits of collective bargaining contribute nothing to the 
union.51 Many employees who choose not to join the union base 
their decisions on objections to positions those unions take and 
activities in which they engage.52 Over time, a sort of uneasy 
compromise was reached, whereby those who chose not to join 
the union would not have to pay dues—nor support political ad-
vocacy by the union—but would be required to pay agency fees.53 
Those agency fees were attempts to measure the fair value of the 
benefits non-members of the union nonetheless derived from the 
union’s activities, such as collective bargaining.54 The non-member 
would not be required to support union activities or positions she 
disagreed with, and the unions would not be required to provide 
the benefit of its services to non-members for free.55 
B. The Elephant (and Donkey) in the Room: Public Unions Play 
a Major Role in Politics 
 Public unions play a major role in local, state, and national 
politics, operating as “political machines.”56 Public unions have 
50 See Jon O. Shimabukuro, Congressional Research Service: Collective Bar-
gaining and Employees in the Public Sector, CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 30, 2011), 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www
.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2241&context=key_workplace [https://perma 
.cc/G425-39XN]. 
51 See Andrew Hanna & Caitlin Emma, Supreme Court Could Cripple Public 
Unions in Run-up to 2018 Midterms, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www 
.politico.com/story/2018/02/25/supreme-court-public-unions-2018-midterms-423 
436 [https://perma.cc/E4RP-ACKF]. 
52 See id. 
53 See David Greene & Nina Totenberg, Transcript, Supreme Court Rules 
Against Mandatory Union Dues for Public Employees, NPR (June 27, 2018, 11:19 
AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/27/623851752/supreme-court-rules-against 
-mandatory-union-dues-for-public-employees [https://perma.cc/SL7B-Y4TV]. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 Horacio A. Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea & Pablo Querubin, The Role of 
Labor Unions as Political Machines: Evidence from the Case of the Mexican 
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deep coffers of money and a ready group of members and sup-
porters they can mobilize to support or oppose a party, candidate, 
or issue.57 The American Federation of State, County, and Munici-
pal Employees (AFSCME) and its affiliates spent $26 million on 
the 2016 election cycle, according to federal election records, virtu-
ally all of which was spent trying to elect Democrats.58 If spending 
by the National Education Association, the American Federation 
of Teachers, and the Service Employees International Union are 
added, the total for the 2016 cycle rises to about $166 million, 
still almost exclusively deployed to help Democratic candidates 
and causes.59 An analysis of the spending by federal public em-
ployee unions reveals that some of these unions, including The 
American Federation of Government Employees, National Treas-
ury Employees Union, National Association of Postal Supervisors, 
and National Postal Mail Handlers Union, made in excess of 90 
percent of their political contributions to Democratic causes and 
candidates.60 This pattern of spending has earned public unions 
favor and influence from Democrats and enmity from Republi-
cans.61 A Congressional Research Service report from 2014 esti-
mated that depriving public unions of agency fees would reduce 
that figure to closer to $55 million, a difference of approximately 
$111 million for a single election cycle.62 
 One long-standing criticism of public unions is the apparent 
conflict of interest in having those unions negotiate the terms of a 
labor agreement with political leaders they may have helped to elect 
Teachers’ Union, INST. FOR QUANTITATIVE SOC. SCI., HARV. UNIV., at 2 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.iq.harvard.edu/files/iqss/files/updated_march_6_paper.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/ETZ5-UA3Z]. 
57 See id. 
58 Hanna & Emma, supra note 51. 
59 Id. 
60 Ralph R. Smith, Tallying Political Donations from Federal Employees 
and Unions, FEDSMITH (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.fedsmith.com/2016/12/21 
/tallying-political-donations-from-federal-employees-and-unions/ [https://perma 
.cc/2RCB-TW49]. 
61 See AP: Brown’s Appointments Favor Democrats, CBS SACRAMENTO 
(Aug. 28, 2011), https://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2011/08/28/ap-browns-appoint 
ments-favor-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/94TL-XR24]. 
62 Hanna & Emma, supra note 51 (citing Benjamin Collins, Right to Work 
Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jan. 6, 
2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42575.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6LW-99GP]). 
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and who may be counting on their support in the next campaign.63 
While private unions negotiate for a larger share of the profits of 
a business, public unions negotiate for more tax money.64 If public 
workers strike, they strike against the taxpayers.65 This is a notion 
that even President Franklin D. Roosevelt found “unthinkable 
and intolerable.”66 “The public-employee representatives are paid 
by the unions, and thus beholden to them, while the politicians 
across the table are also beholden to unions, for their campaign 
contributions or votes. The interests of the average nonunion 
American, the public, are not represented.”67 
 These are facts, numbers, and arguments that both par-
ties are acutely aware of.68 Democrats have fought to strengthen 
the influence of public unions, while Republicans have sought to 
diminish them.69 Research comparing the political effects of right-
to-work legislation on counties straddling a state line where one 
county is affected by the legislation and the other is not show 
the profound effects of such legislation.70 When Republicans 
have been successful in passing right-to-work laws, the power of 
unions has been reduced and Democratic candidates have suf-
fered.71 In presidential elections, for example, such right-to-work 
laws have cost Democratic candidates an estimated two to five 
percentage points.72 That margin is more than that by which 
63 See James Sherk, F.D.R. Warned Us About Public Unions, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/18/the-first 
-blow-against-public-employees/fdr-warned-us-about-public-sector-unions [https:// 
perma.cc/6YS9-WRBB]. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Amity Shlaes, The Great Public Union Divide, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 26, 
2012, 8:30 PM), http://www.startribune.com/the-great-public-union-divide/18 
4858651 [https://perma.cc/3E8H-ZJ54]. 
68 See generally James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Vanessa 
Williamson, Right-to-Work Laws Have Devastated Unions—and Democrats, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/opinion/conor 
-lamb-unions-pennsylvania.html [https://perma.cc/592L-HYWR]. 
69 See generally Sean McElwee, How the Right’s War on Unions Is Killing 
the Democratic Party, THE NATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com 
/article/right-to-work-laws-are-killing-democrats-at-the-ballot-box/ [https://perma 
.cc/8ZWP-ER5V]. 
70 See Feigenbaum et al., supra note 68; see also McElwee, supra note 69.  
71 Feigenbaum et al., supra note 68. 
72 Id. 
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Donald Trump prevailed over Hillary Clinton in Michigan and 
Wisconsin in 2016.73 One hotly contested political battleground 
has been over whether public unions should be allowed to charge 
agency fees to non-members for the costs of collective bargaining.74 
Unsurprisingly, agency fees are far more common in so-called 
“blue states,” traditionally controlled by Democrats who are more 
supportive of and reliant on unions.75 The battle over the degree 
of compulsion unions can exert over non-members often reaches the 
courts, where the contours of that battle can be traced through a 
series of judicial decisions. 
C. The Road from Abood to Janus 
 In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked in Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education to find a workable solution that bal-
anced the interests of the non-union workers and the unions.76 
The rule that emerged from Abood and the line of cases that 
followed (“the Abood Rule”) stated that unions could not compel 
workers to join nor pay for their “political and other ideological 
activities,” but they could charge those workers fees for the efforts 
the unions expended in collective bargaining on their behalf.77 
While the Abood Court readily conceded that this was a form of 
compelled speech, its narrow ruling attempted to navigate two com-
plications.78 First, the fact (conceded by the Court) that economic 
issues for public sector employees are always necessarily “politi-
cal” (because they involve public tax dollars) and thus trigger 
First Amendment protections; second, the governmental interest in 
maintaining “peace” in industrial economic relations via collec-
tive bargaining’s implementation of a single representative body 
73 See id. 
74 See Robert Iafolla, Some U.S. States Embrace Pro-Union Laws, with Key 
Fees Imperiled, REUTERS (June 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa 
-court-unions-states/some-u-s-states-embrace-pro-union-laws-with-key-fees-im 
periled-idUSKBN1JN2F4 [https://perma.cc/S3U3-JLA3].  
75 See id.; see also Alexander Russo, Maps: Where The 21 “Agency Fee” States 
Are—For Now, SCHOLASTIC (Sept. 28, 2015), https://scholasticadministrator.type 
pad.com/thisweekineducation/2015/09/maps-where-the-21-agency-fee-states 
-are-for-now.html#.XP8otohKjIV [https://perma.cc/VH6F-2M8N]. 
76 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977). 
77 Id. at 209, 235–36. 
78 See id. at 235–36. 
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to advocate for diverse populations of employees.79 Ultimately—
and ever since Abood—compulsory agency fees were held to sur-
vive the scrutiny of a First Amendment violation because, while 
they were a form of “compelled speech,” they served the state’s 
compelling interest in preventing disruptions of the “peace” in labor 
and industrial relations.80 
 The Abood decision lasted for forty-one years: from the eco-
nomic malaise of the 1970s, through the decline of American in-
dustry in the 1980s, and up to the height of the “disrupted” digital 
economy of the early twenty-first century.81 In that time, twenty-
two states enacted laws permitting unions and public employers 
to take agency fees from a worker’s paycheck without his or her 
consent.82 However, unions were required to separate their politi-
cal or advocacy activities from collective bargaining activities.83 
As the Court repeatedly ruled: they could charge non-union 
members agency fees for the latter but could in no way require 
workers to support the former.84 In 2018, the Janus decision 
ended this practice by overturning Abood.85 
II. JANUS: ARGUMENTS, RULING, & IMMEDIATE REACTION 
 Mark Janus was a child support specialist from the State 
of Illinois.86 He was represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME).87 Mr. Janus ob-
jected to a number of the union’s political positions and activi-
ties—specifically, that AFSCME’s “behavior in bargaining does 
not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not 
79 See id. at 219, 224–25, 228. 
80 See id. at 236. 
81 See Moshe Marvit, The Legal Arguments of Janus v. AFSCME Explained, 
CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/legal-argu 
ments-janus-v-afscme-explained/?session=1&agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/N4 
9P-RXA2]. 
82 See id.  
83 See id. 
84 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222–23. 
85 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448, 2456 (2018). 
86 Id. at 2461.  
87 Id. 
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reflect his best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens”—and 
chose not to join the union.88 Under the Abood Rule, Mr. Janus was 
nonetheless charged a fee of $23.48 per pay period (an “agency 
fee”), which could be used to fund the union’s legally required 
mandate to represent all employees in collective bargaining, but 
not “political or ideological” views.89 Mr. Janus’s agency fee rep-
resented 78 percent of a union-member’s dues.90 He challenged 
this “agency fee”—and thus the Abood rule—by claiming that 
financial support for the union (via money withheld from his wages) 
violated his Constitutional right (as a government employee) to 
free political speech.91 
 Overturning Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately 
sided with Mr. Janus.92 First, it held that the State’s extraction 
of agency fees from non-consenting public employees violated 
the First Amendment because “no reliance interest [on agency 
fees] on the part of public sector unions are sufficient to justify 
the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has 
countenanced for the past 41 years.”93 Second, following their 
decision in Knox v. Service Employees (2012), the Court held that 
no form of payment to a public sector union may be deducted or 
collected unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.94 
Understanding the history of these legal debates—and the exact 
standard that the Court applies to “compelled” speech for gov-
ernment employees—is key to understanding how the Janus 
decision’s conceptualization of the First Amendment could have 
larger consequences for the future of collective bargaining.95 
 To start, it must be understood that there is nothing legally 
novel about Mr. Janus’s First Amendment claim, or the Janus 
decision recognizing that “agency fees” are a violation of a non-union 
employee’s right to free political expression.96 In fact, the entire 
Abood line of precedent on these agency fee cases presumes that 
88 Id. 
89 See Marvit, supra note 81. 
90 Id. 
91 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2462. 
92 See id. at 2486. 
93 Id. at 2460. 
94 See id. at 2486. 
95 See id. at 2464–65. 
96 See id. 
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the First Amendment rights of non-union workers are being vio-
lated through the government’s administration and funding of 
collective bargaining, but allow this free speech violation be-
cause it serves a compelling state interest in the maintenance of 
“labor peace.”97  
Instead, what lies at the legal heart of Janus (and Abood) 
is a more practical question of economics and legislative imple-
mentation. If the AFSCME is legally required to collectively 
bargain and negotiate for all employees—whether they choose to 
join the union or not—at what point do free-riders (like Mr. Janus) 
make it financially impossible for the unions to carry out their 
legal duty? Should workers, like Mr. Janus, be required (despite 
clear First Amendment objections) to pay their fair share? 
 As Justice Kagan explained in her Janus dissent, the 
free-rider problem—and its potentially existential consequences 
for unions—is “basic economy theory.”98 If workers will benefit 
from the union’s collective bargaining regardless of whether they 
choose to pay for it, there is, obviously, a diminished incentive to 
pay.99 (Which only matters, constitutionally, because the union 
itself may become defunded to the point that it cannot conduct 
effective collective bargaining for all employees). The First 
Amendment question is thus fairly narrow: does the governmen-
tal interest in maintaining “peaceful” labor relations—via collec-
tive bargaining with a union—justify violating a non-union 
member’s free speech rights in the collection of agency fees? In 
the cases preceding Janus, the Court concluded that the free-
rider problem outweighed the Constitutional violation of public 
sector employee rights.100 Or—to be more precise on this critical 
point—the Court deferred to Congress and state legislatures on 
the question of whether collective bargaining was key to peace-
ful labor relations and simply recognized that this was a compel-
ling enough state interest to survive judicial scrutiny. In Janus, 
the Court implemented a new standard of First Amendment 
scrutiny without explicitly saying what exactly this new level of 
heightened judicial scrutiny would be.101 After hypothetically 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. 
100 See id. at 2489. 
101 See id. at 2465. 
2020] JANUS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  625 
applying exacting and strict scrutiny, the Court only concluded that 
agency fees did not pass even the more “permissive” of tests.102 
After Janus, all that is known is that agency fees are constitu-
tionally protected political speech that cannot be violated by merely 
demonstrating that “a government employer could reasonably 
believe that the exaction of agency fees serves its interests.”103 
 The effects of the Janus holdings are likely far-reaching. 
As the arguments from the AFSCME (and the press prognostica-
tions before and after Janus) attest, the removal of agency fees will 
likely reduce the funds available to public sector unions, which 
may then reduce those unions’ efficacy in collective bargaining, and 
(because the issues of politics and economics are always intertwined 
with labor issues) may sap unions of their political influence.104 This 
process has already started, with the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) losing ninety-eight per-
cent and ninety-four percent of their agency fee-paying members 
respectively in the year following the Janus decision.105 
 As a practical matter, since many legislative bodies man-
date collective bargaining as a management strategy to maintain 
“labor peace” (i.e., they prefer to negotiate with a single union 
rather than individual employees or competing unions), logistical 
and accounting proposals to circumvent the Janus ruling have 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 For instance, see A Bogus Free Speech Argument at the Supreme Court 
is Union Busting in the Name of the 1st Amendment, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-scotus-unions-201802 
27-story.html [https://perma.cc/6GBK-HDWE]; Garret Epps, The Bogus Free 
Speech Argument Against Unions, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2018), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-bogus-free-speech-argument 
-against-unions/553205/ [https://perma.cc/2JDQ-DKZ6]; Eric Levitz, Demo-
crats Paid a Huge Price for Letting Unions Die, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 26, 
2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/01/democrats-paid-a-huge-price-for 
-letting-unions-die.html [https://perma.cc/96AX-LB9P]; Adam Liptak, Supreme 
Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-orga 
nized-labor.html [https://perma.cc/B7LE-X6PX]. 
105 Eric Boehm, After the Supreme Court Said Unions Can’t Force Non-
Members to Pay Dues, Almost All of Them Stopped, REASON MAGAZINE (Apr. 9, 
2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/09/janus-211000-workers-fled-seiu-afscme/ 
[https://perma.cc/G4JE-8FKJ] (citing filings with the U.S. Dep’t of Labor). 
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already emerged from legal academics.106 For instance, Eugene 
Volokh argues that rather than forcing employees to pay unions, 
states could simply reduce employee salaries and then pay that 
money to the unions directly.107 Benjamin Sachs argues that the 
fact that “agency fees” pass through the hands of employees at 
all—rather than being paid directly from the state to the unions—
makes this First Amendment quagmire a mere accounting issue.108 
 While these predictions on the political and policy implica-
tions of Janus are intriguing, a significantly more interesting—and 
potentially revolutionary—part of the Janus decision has received 
scant attention: how the Court views collective bargaining in 
relation to free speech and the consequences of this view for how 
the First Amendment is applied to governmental employees. We 
believe that the current U.S. Supreme Court is moving toward 
holding that the act of negotiating with one’s employer is a pro-
tected form of expression. To better see the Constitutional impli-
cation of this reframing—and the arguments that the Supreme 
Court is likely to rely on to make labor negotiations a form of 
protected political speech in the public sector—we turn to the 
rhetorical dimensions of Janus to analyze the potential conse-
quences (legal, political, and economic) of the decision. 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ROAD FROM JANUS TO THE 
ELIMINATION OF COMPULSORY COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 
 While the right to economic self-expression in employee 
negotiation may seem like “common sense,” the legal fact is that 
applying First Amendment protections to employees’ economic 
speech in the public sector is not straightforward. A bit of dicta 
from Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Janus makes the connec-
tions between individual liberty and labor negotiation clear: 
106 See Eugene Volokh & Mark Janus, The Limited Effects of the Supreme 
Court’s Janus Decision, The Volokh Conspiracy, REASON MAGAZINE (June 27, 
2018), https://reason.com/2018/06/27/the-limited-effects-of-the-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/7TYV-S94B]. 
107 Id. 
108 Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment (Harv. Public 
Law, Working Paper No. 17-48, Sept. 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041341 [https://perma.cc/B3B6-6DGJ]. 
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Designating a union as the employees’ exclusive representa-
tive substantially restricts the rights of individual employees. 
Among other things, this designation means that individual 
employees may not be represented by any agent other than 
the designated union; nor may individual employees negotiate 
directly with their employer.109 
 The right to negotiate is closely intertwined with the right 
to contract.110 If workers have the right to sell their time and 
skills to an employer, then they likewise have the right to bar-
gain for the most favorable possible terms for that exchange. 
Historically, some liberals and union advocates have maintained 
that an individual right of contract weakened the power of labor 
and unions, to the detriment of workers generally.111 Roscoe Pound, 
the former Dean of Harvard Law School railed against: 
The currency in juristic thought of an individualist conception 
of justice, which exaggerates the importance of property and 
of contract, exaggerates private right at the expense of public 
right, and is hostile to legislation, taking a minimum of law-
making to be the ideal.112 
 The current conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, led in this case by Justice Alito, seemed to take a different 
view.113 The Court seemed inclined to revive the doctrine of eco-
nomic substantive due process associated with the Lochner era.114 
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Court unanimously held that: 
[T]he right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his 
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and 
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful call-
ing; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that pur-
pose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neces-
sary and essential to his carrying out to a successful 
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.115 
109 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2460 (2018). 
110 See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909). 
111 See id. at 470. 
112 Id. at 457. 
113 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484. 
114 See id. at 2479. 
115 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
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 The Allgeyer decision was based on reading the word lib-
erty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
include a liberty of contract.116 It is possible but unlikely that 
the Supreme Court will simply revive this way of thinking. 
There are significant divisions on the Court with respect to the 
very concept of substantive due process.117 The same conserva-
tive Justices who are likely to be sympathetic to strengthening 
the individual right to contract have often been critical of their 
liberal colleagues using substantive due process to achieve their 
desired results.118 Rather than risk charges of hypocrisy on that 
issue, it seems more likely that Court’s conservative majority 
will approach this issue as one implicating the First Amendment 
rather than the Fourteenth. 
 While there may be a Due Process right inherent to labor 
negotiation, it must be remembered that the Janus opinion—
beyond Alito’s dicta—does not rule on that novel question, but 
rather the issue of First Amendment protections.119 Which means 
if Justice Alito is to successfully hold his coalition of five votes 
from Janus together and continue to chip away at compulsory 
collective bargaining, a more persuasive argument will have to be 
constructed to explain how exclusive representation “substan-
tially restricts the rights of individual employees” in the context 
of the Court’s free speech precedents. 
 We believe the Janus decision is likely to be followed by a 
series of decisions, made over the course of years, which gradually 
limit the practice of compulsory collective bargaining in the name 
of a First Amendment right to negotiation. Given the complexities 
of this paradigm (which only applies to the narrow case of govern-
mental employees, but could be understood more broadly as an 
affirmation of free speech rights for all public and private workers), 
what follows are a variety of principles—legal and rhetorical—
the Court is likely to rely on for such an effort and some of their 
possible consequences for both the shaping of public workers’ 
116 Id. 
117 See Sol Wachtler, Dred Scott Raises Its Ugly Head Again, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 12, 
2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/03/12/dred-scott-raises-its 
-ugly-head-again/?slreturn=20190421140942 [https://perma.cc/78MG-AVVE]. 
118 Id.; see also Gilad Edelman, John Roberts Has a Point, LIFE OF THE LAW 
(July 2, 2015), https://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2015/07/john-roberts-has-a-point/ 
[https://perma.cc/SJ7X-S2RJ]. 
119 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480. 
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understanding of free speech and the nature of “labor peace” in 
the post-digital era of economic and political disruption. 
A. Principle One: Negotiation Is Protected Expression 
 Negotiation is a discussion with another, aimed at reaching 
an agreement.120 It is logically—and in the public imagination—
a form of inherently expressive conduct, where a party advocates 
for his needs or interests. In a 2008 case from Seattle that 
struck down a rule aimed at limiting housing discrimination, the 
King County Superior Court described negotiation as a “valuable 
speech activit[y]” that trumps other governmental interests.121 Forc-
ing someone—through mandated collective bargaining—to acqui-
esce to a negotiating position she disagrees with (or to remain 
silent while someone purportedly advocating for her takes a 
position with which she disagrees) is, as the Court has long un-
derstood, constitutionally problematic. Additionally, as Janus 
makes clear, wage negotiations between a public worker’s union 
and a governmental entity involve how much the public will be 
required to pay (via taxes), making these conversations inher-
ently a matter of public political concern.122 
 For many Americans, particularly those of a libertarian 
bent, these principles seem straightforward: labor negotiations 
with governmental entities are an important form of economic 
speech, deserving of the same First Amendment protections as 
other political discourse.123 But in the context of government 
employees and public workers, First Amendment claims always 
trigger other complications. While the First Amendment, extended 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the 
federal government from abridging the freedom of speech, em-
ployees that are truly in the private sector, by definition, have no 
First Amendment protections.124 But while the federal government 
120 Negotiation, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, https://www 
.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/negotiation?q=negotiation 
[https://perma.cc/5W3J-2UU4]. 
121 Yim v. City of Seattle, No. 17-2-05595-6 SEA, 2018 WL 10140201, at *5 (Wash. 
Super., King County Mar. 28, 2018) (emphasis added). 
122 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474. 
123 See Volokh & Janus, supra note 106. 
124 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. 
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cannot generally prohibit an individual from expressing his be-
liefs, the corollary to that proposition is found in the Compelled 
Speech Doctrine, which prohibits the government from requiring 
a person or organization to engage in speech or expression they 
disagree with or find objectionable except when the government 
proves that the compelled speech acts “are narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state purpose.”125 
 In considering how—via Janus—future courts could attempt 
to extend free speech protection to negotiation, three legal and 
policy questions then emerge: (1) what constitutes the outside 
parameters of “employee speech” (in a public workplace) that are 
deserving of First Amendment protections; (2) does negotiation 
(as a free speech right for governmental employees) always out-
weigh the compelling state interest in promoting labor peace; and 
(3) what is the connection between government employees’ First 
Amendment rights and management’s ability to maintain stable 
relations within its workforce? 
 Questions (1) and (2) are ultimately issues of communication 
with potentially far-reaching consequences for the management 
(and information management) of governmental workers. As Jus-
tice Kagan’s dissent in Janus makes clear, “The Court’s decisions 
have long made plain that government entities have substantial 
latitude to regulate their employees’ speech—especially about 
terms of employment—in the interest of operating their work-
places effectively.”126 What becomes complicated after Janus is 
that by equating Mr. Janus’s withheld wages (via agency fees) with 
protected public speech, the distinction between government 
employees speaking “as citizen[s] on matters of public concern” 
(which was often protected) and employees speaking on issues of 
“merely private employment matters” (which was often unpro-
tected) collapses.127 Instead of examining the specific content of 
a government employee’s speech, Kagan argues, the Court’s pre-
Janus focus was historically a rhetorical analysis of the commu-
nicative audience an employee was trying to reach: “whether the 
speech was truly of the workplace—addressed to it, made in it 
125 Andrew Jensen, Compelled Speech, Expressive Conduct, and Wedding 
Cakes: A Commentary on Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Com-
mission, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 150 (2018). 
126 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 2495 (citations omitted). 
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and (most of all) about it.”128 Anticipating the (potentially enor-
mous) First Amendment complications that would arise from 
reading Janus as constitutionally equating all governmental 
employee speech about labor issues as political matters of “pub-
lic concern,” Kagan writes: 
But arguing about the terms of employment is still arguing 
about the terms of employment: The workplace remains both 
the context and the subject matter of the expression. If all that 
speech really counted as “of public concern,” as the majority sug-
gest, the mass of public employee’s complaints (about pay and 
benefits and workplace policy and such) would become ‘federal 
constitutional issue[s].... And contrary to decades’ worth of 
precedent, government employers would then have far less 
control over their workforces than private employers do.129 
 While Supreme Court opinions are notoriously impenetrable 
for laypeople—and ignorance of the law is never an excuse—
Janus’s “labor peace” standard opens up a unique legal (and 
rhetorical) relationship between workers’ understanding of their 
free speech rights and First Amendment precedent.130 Supreme 
Court cases do not—as decades of research in legal rhetoric have 
demonstrated—occur in a vacuum.131 As the final, and most 
public and publicized arbiter of rights, Supreme Court opinions 
do not merely control legal doctrine but also, rhetorically, create 
and shape the civic fabric of what citizens perceive to be their 
Constitutional rights.132 (Creating what communication theorist 
Gerald Hauser calls the “vernacular” public understanding of 
Constitutional protections.133) Already, in recent years, First 
Amendment rulings (even beyond public union cases) have woven 
a new regime—in the public imagination—of what constitutes 
one’s free speech rights vis-à-vis their capital, taxes, and labor.134 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 2496. 
130 See id. 
131 For a literature overview, see THE RHETORIC OF THE LAW (Austin Sarat 
& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996). 
132 GERALD HAUSER, VERNACULAR VOICES: THE RHETORIC OF PUBLICS AND 
PUBLIC SPHERE 57 (1999). 
133 Id. 
134 Case in point, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court, while reversing the 
Colorado Supreme Court on narrow grounds, nonetheless recognized that 
requiring a devoutly Christian baker to design a cake for a same-sex wedding 
correctly triggered his claim that “using his artistic skills to make an expressive 
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What has been underreported about the Janus decision, however, 
is that by equating a government employee’s taxpayer-funded 
wages with free speech (i.e., equating money with ideological 
expression), the Court has eroded the firewall distinction be-
tween labor (e.g., what one “does” at work) and politics (e.g., how 
we debate and argue about what a governmental employee does, 
or does not do, at work). 
 While a seemingly esoteric point—and also, ironically, a 
fairly purebred Marxist interpretation of the symbolically political 
nature of all labor—the practical (i.e., management) consequences 
of collapsing the difference between what is a “workplace” issue 
and what is a “public concern” could have significant legal con-
sequences for continuing to apply Janus’s First Amendment stand-
ard to employee labor issues.135 If, to meet the Janus test, the 
Court has to weigh the compelling state interest in promoting 
“peaceful” labor relations and “industrial” labor stability, what 
happens when everything a governmental employee does (or says 
or is paid) at work becomes a matter of protected political free 
speech?136 In the 2006 Garcetti case, Justice Kennedy already 
predicted the practical consequences (for governmental managers 
and the courts) of extending Janus-esque First Amendment protec-
tions to public sector workers, arguing that it would “commit state 
and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, man-
dating judicial oversight of communications between and among 
government employees and their superiors in the course of offi-
cial business.”137 Such a “displacement of managerial discretion 
by judicial supervision finds no support in our precedents.”138 
 An absurd—but legally logical—hypothetical outlines the po-
tential future contours of Janus’s free speech paradigm and its 
consequences for smooth labor relations: a worker, caught in the 
2018–2019 government shutdown, could argue that his First 
Amendment rights were violated because he and his coworkers 
statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation, 
has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep 
and sincere religious beliefs.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721 (2018); see also Nat. Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368, 2378 (2018); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n 
of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988). 
135 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 2488 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
137 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006). 
138 Id. at 423. 
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were not being paid.139 Just as Mr. Janus’s case ultimately rested 
on his pre-paycheck wages being legally funneled to the AFCME 
(which constitutes “political speech” because it involves the public 
debate over the distribution of tax dollars) our “Shutdown Worker’s” 
pre-paycheck wages are withheld (entirely) because of a manage-
ment decision to suspend the federal government for budgetary 
negotiation purposes.140 In both cases, wages and labor are con-
strued—practically via taxes, politically via their symbolic power—
as ideological discourse meriting First Amendment protection.141 
If working and having some portion of your pay diverted (via agency 
fees) to a state-mandated union is an unlawful violation of free 
speech (because, according to Janus, the betrayal of your political 
viewpoint outweighs the state’s interest in “peaceful labor relations” 
via particular management tactics), then working and having all 
of your pay diverted (via a shutdown imposed by management in 
the Executive Branch or legislature as part of a political strategy 
of negotiation) is a similarly unlawful violation.142 Or maybe it 
only seems to be (to a confused governmental employee looking for 
cues in Janus to exercise their First Amendment rights). Ordi-
narily, how a worker might read a First Amendment case wouldn’t 
have constitutional bearing, but Janus’s labor peace standard—
which was the controlling standard in Abood—allows this sort of 
rhetorical speculation on what workers might do (and how disrup-
tive it might be) to be relevant legal evidence.143 Justice Alito’s 
majority opinion made clear that in the Court’s view, there was 
simply no evidence beyond speculation that supported the Court’s 
reasoning in Abood that exclusive representation and agency fees 
were necessary to maintain labor peace.144 
 While an extreme case, our government shutdown example 
illustrates the more fundamental point: the end-game political 
consequences of extending free speech rights to labor issues in 
government employment contexts is uncertain at best. And, because 
the Janus test continues to uphold stable labor relations as a com-
pelling state interest, these political and economic predictions about 
governmental management strategy (and the political reaction 
139 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 
140 See id. at 2462. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 2488. 
143 See id. at 2477 n.23. 
144 Id. at 2465. 
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to it) have potential legal consequences for the First Amendment.145 
In other words, after Alito opens up the “labor peace” Pandora’s 
box by weighing in on what legislative policies (in the Janus case, 
agency fees) best allow for labor stability (by claiming that de-
clining union power has not, empirically and as a matter of evi-
dence, created economic “pandemonium”), any policy that could 
hypothetically disturb the economic “peace” now has hypothetical 
merit that has to be judicially considered. In the next Section, we 
see how the traditional critiques of unions could also be implicated, 
as legal arguments, in attempts to extend First Amendment 
protection to negotiation. 
B. Principle Two: Mandatory Collective Bargaining Creates a 
Principal-Agent Problem 
 Mandatory collective bargaining requires a union to act as 
the exclusive bargaining agent for an entire class of employ-
ees.146 Workers often generally benefit from collective bargain-
ing, both in terms of salary and compensation and employment 
benefits.147 The portion of a worker’s salary that goes to pay the 
union in the form of agency fees will often be a small percentage 
of that benefit.148 If an employee receives a salary increase of 
$5000 a year but pays $1000 to the union as an agency fee, can 
she really claim to be damaged while netting a benefit of $4000?149 
Yet the analysis of whether an individual employee benefits from 
union representation is not that simple. 
 Collective bargaining gained favor and became a bargaining 
tactic based on the logic that—by uniting employees through their 
trade similarities versus their individual differences—it provided 
workers with more power and resulted in those workers receiv-
ing more in compensation and better working conditions.150 But, 
as with political representation in a two-party system, the inter-
ests of a union and its particular (and particularly disaffected) 
145 Id. at 2465. 
146 Sachs, supra note 108, at 1047. 
147 See AFL-CIO, Collective Bargaining, https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/em 
power-workers/collective-bargaining [https://perma.cc/3RTP-EWW2]. 
148 Sachs, supra note 108, at 1068. 
149 Id. (citing JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 493 
(1894 ed.)). 
150 See AFL-CIO, supra note 147. 
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employees are often not aligned: the union’s negotiating posture 
will necessarily have to favor certain employees at the expense 
of others. This—in essence—was Mr. Janus’s complaint, which 
he explained in The Chicago Tribune before filing his lawsuit: 
I don’t see my union working totally for the good of Illinois 
government. For years it supported candidates who put Illinois 
into its current budget and pension crisis. Government unions 
have pushed for government spending that made the state’s 
fiscal situation worse. How is that good for the people of the 
state? Or, for that matter, my fellow union members who face 
the threat of layoffs or their pension funds someday running 
dry? The union voice is not my voice. The union’s fight is not 
my fight.151 
In his opinion supporting Mr. Janus’s First Amendment 
rights to political speech—while still upholding that “labor 
peace” was a compelling state interest—Justice Alito concluded 
that it was “now clear that Abood’s fears” about instability with-
out collective bargaining were “unfounded.”152 Not only was 
there “no pandemonium” in our labor relations since that deci-
sion back in 1977 but that “[w]hatever may have been the case 
41 years ago when Abood was handed down, it is now undeniable 
that ‘labor peace’ can be achieved ‘through means significantly 
less restrictive ...’ than the assessment of agency fees.”153 While 
Supreme Court decisions typically do not involve the evaluation 
of these sorts of policy questions, Janus—by following the long-
standing “labor peace” standard (but forgoing deference to the 
legislature on it)—opens up a complicated and atypical economic 
question for judicial review: what state policies designed to cre-
ate “labor” and “industrial” stability can warrant violations of 
the First Amendment? And what does this “stability” look like in 
practice after Janus? 
 As Justice Kagan foresaw in her Janus dissent, “State and 
local government that thought [collective bargaining] provisions 
151 Mark Janus, Why I Don’t Want to Pay Union Dues, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 5, 
2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-union-dues-su 
preme-court-afscme-perspec-0106-20160105-story.html [http://perma.cc/D2 
NR-MP8J]. 
152 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2248, 2465 (2018). 
153 Id. at 2457. 
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furthered their interests will need to find new ways of managing 
their workforces. Across the country, the relationships of public 
employees and employers will alter in both predictable and wholly 
unexpected ways.”154 And as the post-Janus Court contemplates 
the extension of free speech protections to cover “negotiation” in the 
public sector (and thus eliminate collective bargaining), we turn 
our rhetorical analysis—ironically—to three traditional critiques 
of unions to help clarify (as matters of future management policy 
for governmental workers) why they were so preferred by some 
legislatures as to be a “compelling” state interest.155 At the heart 
of each critique is the “Principle-Agent” problem. 
C. Principle Three: Unions Are Less Attractive Options for  
Workers than They Once Were 
 For a variety of reasons, union membership has dropped 
over the past several decades.156 Federal and state laws have 
improved working conditions and enshrined worker protections 
into law.157 Federal minimum wages have risen and many states 
have minimum wages that are higher than that mandated by 
federal law.158 Employees have more rights and power than they 
have historically.159 The nature of work has changed with workers 
changing jobs more frequently.160 The plethora of benefits that 
154 Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
155 See id. at 2464–65; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
156 Quoctrung Bui, 50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership, In One Map, 
NPR (Feb. 23, 2015, 11:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02 
/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-union-membership-in-one-map [https:// 
perma.cc/99YX-HF55]. 
157 Graham Boone, Labor Law Highlights, 1915–2015, U.S. BUREAU LABOR 
STATS., 1–4 (Oct. 2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/pdf/labor-law 
-highlights-1915-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5H3-7QTV]. 
158 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm 
Employment Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2019, https://www.dol 
.gov/agencies/whd/state/minimum-wage/history [https://perma.cc/4NBT-QRFL]. 
159 Press Release, Economic Policy Institute, Today’s labor unions give work-
ers the power to improve their jobs and unrig the economy (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.epi.org/press/todays-labor-unions-give-workers-the-power-to-im 
prove-their-jobs-and-unrig-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7ZL6-BGBH]. 
160 Jean Chatzky, Job-hopping is on the rise. Should you consider switching 
roles to make more money?, NBC (Apr. 24, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://www.nbc 
news.com/better/business/job-hopping-rise-should-you-consider-switching-roles 
-make-more-ncna868641 [https://perma.cc/QS5S-WM5F]. 
2020] JANUS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  637 
have become available from maternity/paternity care, health bene-
fits, tuition reimbursement, retirement accounts, paid time off, 
etc. have made it more difficult for negotiators to represent the 
interests of large groups of employees.161 As more workers per-
ceive their interests to be different from those the union advocates, 
union membership has declined.162 
1. Individual Interests of Employees in a Workplace Are—By 
Definition—Unreconcilable 
 The “Principal-Agent” problem that is inherent in any po-
litical or economic representation helps us to see the future chal-
lenges of the post-Janus world.163 Central to agency law is the 
principle that the interests of the principal and the agent must 
be aligned.164 Yet some public sector employees and their unions, 
necessarily, view the goals of negotiating very differently. For 
example, if the union pushes for higher pay for longer-tenured 
employees, that may come at the expense of workers who are 
more-qualified or higher-performing.165 If the union pushes for 
better retirement benefits, that may come at the expense of health 
care benefits or higher pay.166 For employees who disagree with 
the union’s negotiating posture, forcing them to accept the un-
ion’s representation and prohibiting them from negotiating for 
themselves creates a principal-agent problem. If an employee 
believes she can negotiate a better deal for herself than the un-
ion has, should she be allowed to negotiate for herself? To take 
the classic example: what if she does not intend to have children, 
so maternity benefits are worthless to her. Should she permitted 
to try to negotiate a deal for herself that removes that benefit, to 
the extent allowable by law, and replaces it with increased com-
pensation, vacation, or some other benefit? 
161 FRANK BURCHILL, LABOUR RELATIONS 83 (4th ed. 2014). 
162 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2248, 2491 (2018). 
163 Aaron Tang, Life After Janus, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 677 nn.38–41 and 
accompanying text (2019). 
164 Pinar Akman, Online Platforms, Agency, and Competition Law: Mind the 
Gap, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 209, 230 (2019).  
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
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 For employees in this situation—like Mr. Janus—the appeal 
of making your personal economic negotiations part of protected 
First Amendment speech are obvious.167 That said, the principle-
agent problem is actually one of the reasons why Congress (and 
many states) prefer to use collective bargaining in the management 
of labor, and why it was constitutionally protected as a compel-
ling state interest. 
 Unions, as representative bodies, are not neutral but instead 
controlled by one group of employees.168 The common critique of 
unions is that mandatory representation is irreconcilable with 
the fair treatment of at least some and often a substantial num-
ber of employees.169 Additionally, as is typically reasoned, “ ... 
conflicts created by individuals’ need for fair treatment at the 
hands of their union could be greatly reduced if exclusivity were 
abandoned and employees were allowed to be represented by their 
own individually chosen agents.”170 We agree. But the stated 
governmental interests in Janus, Abood, and the preceding 
agency fee cases all presumed both of these points.171 While rep-
resentative forms of government are always unfair to particular 
individuals, from a management perspective Congress and state 
legislatures preferred dealing with one actor representing their 
labor force versus a phalanx of individualized and competing 
claims.172 Extending Janus free speech protections may, indeed, 
empower individual rights. But it also—necessarily—moves the 
burden of managing “conflicts created by individuals’ need for 
fair treatment” from unions to (similarly taxpayer funded) gov-
ernmental managers.173 Whether this empowerment of workers 
is desirable or not is an open question. But it certainly seems to 
167 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461–62, 2468. 
168 George Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the In-
terests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 897, 902 (1975). 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 903.  
171 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2450–51, 2468; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 
U.S. 209, 221–22, 220 n.13 (1977).  
172 See Josh Bivens et al., How Today’s Unions Help Working People, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. 1–2 (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/how-todays 
-unions-help-working-people-giving-workers-the-power-to-improve-their-jobs 
-and-unrig-the-economy [https://perma.cc/JW2G-58XH] (discussing the advan-
tages of union in better representing individual voices collectively).  
173 Schatzki, supra note 168, at 903. 
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trigger Janus’s standard for evaluating the effects of “internal” 
labor peace in a workplace. 
2. The Changing Nature of the Workforce Makes Union  
Membership Less Attractive 
 An oddity of unionization is that once a workplace votes to 
unionize, the union becomes the exclusive representative for the 
employees in perpetuity.174 In some states, the unionizing elec-
tions occurred so long ago that no current employees voted for 
the union that represents them.175 And yet, the nature of the 
workforce has also changed substantially since the dawn of col-
lective bargaining. While it once was not unusual for a worker to 
spend his entire career with one company, that is far less com-
mon today.176 In January of 2016, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
found that the median number of years a worker had been with 
his current employer was 4.2 years, down from 4.6 years just two 
years prior in January of 2014.177 According to the Future Work-
place “Multiple Generations @ Work” survey of 1,189 employers 
and 150 managers, 91 percent of millennials expect to stay in a 
job less than three years.178 That means those workers would 
have 15–20 jobs over the course of their working lives.179 
174 Trey Kovacs, House Committee Examines How to Modernize Labor Laws, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Apr. 26, 2018), https://cei.org/blog/house-com 
mittee-examines-how-modernize-labor-laws [http://perma.cc/TUJ4-3VVG]. 
175 James Sherk, Unelected Unions: Why Workers Should Be Allowed to 
Choose Their Representatives, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 27, 2012), https://www 
.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/unelected-unions-why-workers-should-be-al 
lowed-choose-their-representatives [http://perma.cc/K78A-FN34]. 
176 Jean Chatzky, Job-Hopping Is on the Rise. Should You Consider Switching 
Roles to Make More Money?, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nbcnews 
.com/better/business/job-hopping-rise-should-you-consider-switching-roles-make 
-more-ncna868641 [https://perma.cc/9NYM-HZM5]. 
177 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Tenure in 2018, U.S. DEP’T LABOR 
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm [http://perma.cc 
/6TXH-8H6F]; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Tenure in 2014, U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/tenure_09 
182014.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EDB-2YN3]. 
178 Jeanne Meister, The Future of Work: Job Hopping is the ‘New Normal’ 
for Millennials, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/Jeanne 
meister/2012/08/14/the-future-of-work-job-hopping-is-the-new-normal-for-mil 
lennials/#262df6ba13b8 [http://perma.cc/F44E-MM67]. 
179 Id. 
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 An employee with the expectation that she will only work at 
the company for a few years obviously has different compensation 
interests than someone who expects to be employed there for his 
entire career. The union representatives cannot zealously repre-
sent both groups, which have very different economic interests 
in that negotiation.180 Moreover, the very concept of the “labor 
peace” standard has its roots in the notion—accepted by the 
Courts in Abood—that the “principle of exclusive union repre-
sentation ... is a central element in the congressional structuring 
of industrial relations.”181 In 2020, “industrial relations” hardly 
seems like the economic ecosystem in which we live and work.182 
 The challenges of the twenty-first century gig economy—
and the new labor force’s beliefs about what constitutes a living 
wage, fair work-life balance, and protections against discrimination 
in the workplace—are the economic policy issues that will deter-
mine the next American century.183 How extending First Amend-
ment protections to the negotiations of governmental employees 
would affect this question is uncertain. However—again, ironi-
cally—Marxist labor theory offers one prediction: the opening up 
of unions—across workplaces—to organize employees and inde-
pendent contractors of similar trades.184 If compulsory collective 
180 See Adrienne L. Saldaña, Conflicting Interests in Union Representation: 
Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 133 (1992).  
181 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). 
182 Id. 
183 Vice Chair’s Staff of the Joint Economic Committee and Amy Klobuchar, 
The Economic Consequences of Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., at 2–3 (Nov. 2013), https:// 
www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/42dc59a0-6071-46d0-8ff2-9bd7a6b0077 
f/enda---final-11.5.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF5S-D9HJ]; see Aspen Institute 
Staff, Better Work-Life Balance Doesn’t Just Help Employees; It Helps the Whole 
Economy, THE ASPEN INST. (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.org 
/videos/better-work-life-balance-doesnt-just-help-employees-it-helps-the-whole 
-economy/ [https://perma.cc/ZNG9-SESM]; John Frazer, How the Gig Economy 
is Reshaping Careers for the Next Generation, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2019), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/johnfrazer1/2019/02/15/how-the-gig-economy-is-reshap 
ing-careers-for-the-next-generation/#4bb321ab49ad [https://perma.cc/UQW8 
-5FKK]; Eric Ravenscraft, What a ‘Living Wage’ Actually Means, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/smarter-living/what-a-liv 
ing-wage-actually-means.html [https://perma.cc/MP68-96NF]. 
184 See George Fishman, Capitalist Development and Class Capacities: Marxist 
Theory and Union Organization, 15 LAB. STUD. J. 101, 101 (1990) (book review). 
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bargaining is ultimately found to be unconstitutional, one solu-
tion is to permit employees the choice to form and join unions 
which collectively bargain or negotiate directly with their em-
ployers, as they do in the private sector. The likely outcome is 
that workers with aligned interests may choose to collectively 
bargain, while others will choose to negotiate for themselves. A 
typical workforce will be comprised of a number of unions repre-
senting different constituencies and their interests, as well as a 
few employees who choose not to join any union and to go it alone. 
Such an arrangement will provide employees with the right to 
choose whether or not to bargain collectively. But it will also 
lead to precisely the instabilities in labor relations that Abood 
warned of: “‘inter-union rivalries’ [that] would foster ‘dissension 
within the work force’”; employers facing “‘conflicting demands 
from different unions’”; “‘confusion’” as employers attempt to “‘en-
force two or more agreements specifying different terms and 
conditions of employment’”; and unions under attack from “‘rival 
labor organization[s].’”185 
3. Grievance Procedures Are Bureaucratic and Slow Moving 
 Whether and how employees will be afforded due process 
in the workplace is also subject to mandatory collective bargain-
ing.186 Placing a union in the role of exclusive bargaining agent 
affects how employee rights are defined, the types of employer 
behavior subject to the grievance process, and when, how, and 
whether the union will choose to assist an employee with a griev-
ance. This arrangement obviously benefits some employees to 
the detriment of others as workers are often: 
... substantially boxed in between two massive institutions. 
On one side is a large corporation with employees numbering 
in the hundreds of thousands. On the other, a labor organization 
with a million members and an inevitably formidable organi-
zational structure of officialdom and appeals. Relations between 
the two are governed by collective ‘agreements’ running into 
185 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2465 (2018) (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 220–21). 
186 See Richard Wallace, Union Waiver of Public Employee’s Due Process 
Rights, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 583, 584 (1986). 
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the hundreds of pages, looking more like complex statutory 
enactments than contracts, and containing a quasi-judicial 
enforcement machinery, access to which is denied the employee 
when the bargaining representative declines to act.187 
It is not difficult to imagine a case where older, female, disabled, or 
minority employees may be more concerned about how issues re-
lated to sexual harassment or workplace discrimination are dealt 
with in a grievance process than other workers. Those employees 
may understandably believe they have different interests than 
other employees, which the union as the sole bargaining agent 
does not do enough to protect. Unions have a duty of fair repre-
sentation, but the tension between some employees and the union 
raises questions about how hard the union will fight for a griev-
ance it doesn’t believe in or support, or which the union may 
even view as contrary to its own interests.188 The result—as is 
often the case in representative politics—is a tyranny of the ma-
jority, where a simple majority of those who vote within a work-
place can certify a union, which is then the exclusive bargaining 
agent on behalf of that workforce.189 
 As our new economic paradigms create unprecedented 
challenges—and reconfigurations of what it means to be a fairly 
treated and compensated worker in the global economy—these 
issues must be carefully addressed. That said, the pre-Janus 
court was careful to reject “all attempts” at making a “federal 
constitutional issue out of basic ‘employment matters, including 
working conditions, pay, discipline, promotion, leave, vacations, 
and terminations.’”190 Janus—by collapsing the distinction be-
tween workplace and public issues—sets up a potentially un-
precedented (and costly and possibly destabilizing) number of 
legal, economic, and management issues for government officials 
(versus union officials) to handle regarding workplace claims of 
187 Kurt L. Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 
CORNELL L. REV. 25, 31 (1959). 
188 See Beth A. Levine, Labor Law-Bargaining Orders Absent Showing of 
Majority Support for Union, 47 TENN. L. REV. 418, 420 (1979). 
189 Id. 
190 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2495 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Borough of 
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 391 (2011)). 
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discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, sexuality, 
and ability.191 
IV. JANUS IS ALREADY AFFECTING ORGANIZATIONS THAT 
COMPEL MEMBERSHIP OR PARTICIPATION 
 The Janus decision will also hit close to home for many at-
torneys, affecting the operations of state mandatory bar associa-
tions. In the case of Fleck v. Wetch, attorney Arnold Fleck filed suit 
in 2015 to challenge a law that requires North Dakota attorneys to 
not only pass the state’s bar exam, but also to join the state bar 
association and pay member dues, a portion of which support polit-
ical activities.192 Fleck had volunteered time and money to support 
a ballot measure to “establish a presumption that each parent is en-
titled to equal parental rights.”193 Fleck discovered that the North 
Dakota State Bar Association was using his compulsory fees to op-
pose that same ballot measure.194 The Supreme Court had estab-
lished minimum safeguards to prevent this sort of forced subsidy of 
political or ideological activities.195 Fleck filed suit, claiming his 
First Amendment rights were being violated.196 The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a state bar association was permitted to 
charge dues to non-members as “a means of providing regulation in, 
and oversight of, the legal profession.”197 The U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed and vacated that decision, remanding it to the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of 
Janus.198 A similar lawsuit to Fleck is now pending in federal court 
191 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
192 Fleck v. Wetch, 868 F.3d 652, 653 (8th Cir. 2017).  
193 Id. at 652–53.  
194 Id. at 653.  
195 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990); Chicago Tchrs. Union, 
Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); see also Josh Taylor, Bar Association 
on Shaky Ground After Supreme Court’s Summary Disposition, SMOKEBALL 
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.smokeball.com/blog/bar-association-fees-on-shaky 
-ground-after-supreme-courts-summary-disposition/ [https://perma.cc/VP7C 
-XVSE]. 
196 Fleck, 868 F.3d at 653. 
197 Noell Evans, Courts weighing impact of Janus decision on state bar associ-
ations, CENTER SQUARE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.thecentersquare.com/na 
tional/courts-weighing-impact-of-janus-decision-on-state-bar-associations/arti 
cle_605974ec-fc9e-11e8-a3ca-f33c65b24d51.html [https://perma.cc/UV3R-4B7T]. 
198 Fleck v. Welch, 139 S. Ct. 590, 590 (2018). 
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in Oregon.199 Other lawsuits have also been filed in Oklahoma, 
Wisconsin, and Texas.200 
 The Fleck case provides a preview of how the effects of 
Janus will go well beyond public unions and affect all manner of 
other professional organizations.201 In any organization where 1) 
members are forced to join, pay dues, contribute money, or in 
any way support the organization and 2) the organization partic-
ipates in any form of political activity, Janus will force some 
serious changes.202 Those organizations will need to figure out a 
way to create a sort of firewall between any degree of compulsion, 
whether to join, pay money, or participate in activities and any 
type of activity that could arguably implicate the First Amend-
ment rights of dissenting members. It seems clear that the U.S. 
Supreme Court will be closely scrutinizing those relationships 
and looking for anything that looks like compelled speech.203 By 
focusing on how bar associations may respond to Janus, we can 
see some pragmatic paths forward for organizations that could 
illuminate solutions for public-sector unions and the future of 
labor negotiations for government employees. 
 There is a wide division on a state-to-state basis as to how 
bar associations are organized.204 The solution for bar associa-
tions may be as simple as dividing the traditional role of the state 
bar association into mandatory and voluntary functions. The 
Nebraska State Bar Association has adopted that sort of hybrid 
structure.205 Members are required to pay a basic membership 
fee, currently $98.00, in order to practice law. Those fees are used 
199 Gruber v. Or. State Bar, 3:18-cv-1591-JR, 3:18-cv-2139-JR, 2019 WL 
2251282, at *1 (D. Or. 2019). 
200 Mark Pulliam, Bar Wars: Extending Janus to Bar Associations, MISRULE OF 
LAW (May 6, 2019), https://misruleoflaw.com/2019/05/06/bar-wars-extending 
-janus-to-bar-associations/ [https://perma.cc/6MY4-FSCA]. 
201 Id. 
202 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2486 (2018). 
203 Pulliam, supra note 200. 
204 State Bar Ass’ns, LAW. LEGION, https://www.lawyerlegion.com/associa 
tions/state-bar/ [https://perma.cc/UF37-5UQZ]. 
205 Margery A. Beck, State Bar Sees Drop in Dues in Wake of Ruling, LINCOLN 
J. STAR (Sept. 13, 2014), https://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/nebras 
ka/state-bar-sees-drop-in-dues-in-wake-of-ruling/article_65077d74-7834-5c74-b8 
e4-8281e507b2e0.html [https://perma.cc/NB8Y-M83Z]. 
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to support the administration and enforcement of the regulation 
of the practice of law by the Court.206 Members may also choose to 
pay additional voluntary dues “to analyze and disseminate to its 
members information on proposed or pending legislative proposals 
and any other nonregulatory activity intended to improve the 
quality of legal services to the public and promote the purposes of 
the Association.”207 This arrangement is intended to avoid requiring 
attorneys to support political activities they may disagree with as a 
condition of practicing law.208 In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the Fleck appeal, any remaining state bar associations 
who have not organized themselves this way, separating mandatory 
membership from political activities, may be forced to do so.209 
 It is possible, but far less likely, that Janus could also affect 
private unions. Courts have routinely recognized the sovereign-like 
power of unions.210 “Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining 
representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a 
legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom 
it represents....”211 This was not a new concept. In analyzing a pre-
vious case where minority employees felt they lacked fair repre-
sentation, then Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Stone wrote: 
[f]or the representative is clothed with power not unlike that 
of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on 
its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the 
rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under an 
affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights.212 
 With these inherent powers authorized by the National 
Labor Relations Act, unions control the destiny of their employees, 
in similar fashion to the authority granted to state and federal legis-
latures to control the destinies of the citizens it represents.213 By 
contracting with employers to force membership dues or agency 
fees on employees as a condition of employment, the union (as 
206 NEB. SUP. CT. R. 3-803(D). 
207 NEB. SUP. CT. R. 3-803(H). 
208 NEB. SUP. CT. R. 3-803(D). 
209 See Fleck v. Welch, 139 S. Ct. 590, 590 (2018). 
210 Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 198 (citing Virginian R. Co. v. Sys. Fed., 300 U.S. 515, 545 (1937)).  
213 Id. at 202. 
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sovereign authority) is essentially taxing its employees for pub-
lic services.214 If an employee wishes to not be bound to union 
membership or its taxation, the employee must move to a state 
where unions have less legislative authority, much like a citizen 
must move to a different state if he or she does not want to be 
bound to the laws of his or her land. If those organizations then 
participate in political activity, that could implicate the First 
Amendment rights of members who disagree with the positions 
taken by the union.215 As the case for private unions being state 
actors and thus implicating the First Amendment is a difficult 
one to make, the focus of this Article is on public unions. 
 Post-Janus, courts will be placing increasing scrutiny on 
bar associations and other similar organizations to ensure that 
mandatory dues are not being used for anything that could con-
ceivably be considered a political activity.216 This raises some 
interesting and problematic questions. Are there positions on 
issues that are so closely related to the functioning of an organi-
zation that the organization should be permitted to advocate for 
those positions? For example, families with children have been 
recently crossing into the United States from Mexico to seek 
asylum.217 Some of those children are not being provided with 
counsel during court hearings related to their claims for asylum 
or immigration status generally.218 If a state bar association in a 
border state wants to take the position that the government 
should ensure those children are provided with counsel to protect 
their interests, is that permitted under Janus? Would the bar 
association be advocating for due process, right to counsel, and 
other fundamental legal rights, or would they be seen to be wad-
ing into a political issue? If members of that bar association op-
posed to illegal immigration, objecting to their mandatory dues 
being used to support a position they disagree with, how would 
214 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2495 (2018). 
215 Id. at 2467. 
216 Id. at 2486. 
217 Caitlin Dickerson, Border at ‘Breaking Point’ as More Than 76,000 Un-
authorized Migrants Cross in a Month, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), https://nyti 
.ms/2SMMwHk [https://perma.cc/9U4K-XRWB]. 
218 A Guide to Children Arriving at the Border: Laws, Policies and Responses, 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (June 26, 2015), https://www.americanimmi 
grationcouncil.org [https://perma.cc/NTN5-VV3R]. 
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the U.S. Supreme Court view that dispute? There are countless 
conceivable examples where arguments can be made on one side 
that the position is important or consequential (if not essential) 
to the goals, values, etc. of the profession itself, while an equally 
persuasive argument can be raised on the other side that the 
dispute is political in nature and mandatory dues should not be 
spent taking sides on the issue. 
 Another option is for membership in state bar associa-
tions to be completely voluntary. Many bar associations in states 
such as New York operate this way, essentially as trade organi-
zations.219 Making membership and the paying of dues com-
pletely voluntary eliminates the tension between compulsory 
dues being paid to the organization and the organization engag-
ing in political advocacy that some members may object to.220 
But then the question becomes—as it was with Janus—can a 
bar association (or our contemporary understanding of law as a 
profession)—survive, existentially, without compulsory fees? To 
comply with Janus, bar associations and other trade organiza-
tions may have to find a way to divorce any degree of compulsion 
to join or contribute to the organization from any political or 
ideological advocacy the group may engage in.221 
 Many of the principles implicated in these lawsuits in-
volving attorneys who do not want to join or contribute to their 
state bar associations are the same as when public employees 
like Mr. Janus have no wish to be a member of or pay fees to a 
union.222 If an individual is compelled to join or pay fees to an 
organization and thus subsidize speech she disagrees with, the 
Court in Janus made clear that is a First Amendment viola-
tion.223 An individual has a basic constitutional right to speak on 
or remain silent about an issue.224 Forcing a person to endorse a 
position he disagrees with is just as much a violation as prevent-
ing him from voicing his views on an issue.225 Just as agency 
219 State Bar Ass’ns, supra note 204. 
220 Pulliam, supra note 200. 
221 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 
222 Id. at 2456  
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fees represent compelled speech, so, by its very nature, does 
compulsory collective bargaining.226 
 Unions and trade organizations should also see the writ-
ing on the wall and realize that compulsory collective bargaining 
is under threat. They should find ways to more effectively repre-
sent the interests of the workers they represent. One option 
would be to let workers express their employment interests and 
then divide them into smaller bargaining units based on those. 
Younger employees who value increased salary over retirement 
benefits could be represented by a union employee who pushes 
for higher pay, while older employees could choose to push in-
stead for more generous pensions, better health care, etc. Such 
an arrangement would better align the interests of the workers 
and their union representatives and at least reduce the princi-
ple-agent problem. As the Supreme Court continues to make 
clear that compulsory collective bargaining is compelled speech, 
the perceived gap between what workers want and what those 
purporting to represent them focus on in negotiating is going to 
be critical. To the extent that unions can reduce that gap, by 
providing more effective representation, they may be able to stay out 
of the Court’s crosshairs. 
CONCLUSION 
 If an employee is required as a condition of employment to 
accept a deal he may not approve of and which is negotiated by per-
son(s) he has not chosen or elected, then the Janus decision recog-
nized that this arrangement substantially restricts that employee’s 
rights.227 Unions and trade associations that participate in collec-
tive bargaining should be working to increase the engagement 
of, the choices made available to, and the percentage of the or-
ganization’s business that is voted on by the group’s members. 
 Unions and other professional organizations will need to 
figure out ways to create a sort of Chinese wall between any 
degree of compulsion, whether to join, pay money, or participate 
226 Valerie C. Brannon, Bar Dues or Bar Don’t? Compelled Fees and the 
First Amendment, CONG. RES. SERV. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc  
/LSB10233.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EKB-PCRX]. 
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in activities and any type of activity that could arguably impli-
cate the First Amendment rights of dissenting members. Those 
organizations will likewise need to find ways to make the pro-
cesses of choosing representatives and enacting policies more 
representative. Only by implementing these types of measures 
will unions and other trade organizations be able to withstand 
the heightened scrutiny they will increasingly face. 
